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Parker v. Randolph: The Right of
Confrontation and the Interlocking
Confessions Doctrine
By Harvey John Lung*
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... ,J
The significance of this right is that it guarantees a criminal defen-
dant the opportunity to cross-examine any witness who testifies
against him or her.2 Cross-examination allows the defendant to
challenge the truth and the credibility of a witness' testimony3 and
permits the jury to observe the demeanor of the witness while on
the stand.4 The right of confrontation traditionally has been af-
forded great protection by the United States Supreme Court.5 In
* B.A., 1978, University of Washington. Member, Third Year Class.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
2. "The right of confrontation is the right to the opportunity of cross-examination." 5
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1365, 1395 (J. Chadboum rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as WL
MORE]. See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 19 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Mc-
CORMCK]. Cross-examination has developed from the practice in early English law of offer-
ing depositions, confessions of accomplices, letters, and other documents as evidence against
defendants. Along with other trial rights, cross-examination became recognized as an impor-
tant means of protecting defendants from false charges, and of affording them a fair trial.
See 9 W. HOLDswORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 225-30 (1926); 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY
OF THE CRmIMNAL LAW OF ENGLAND 326 (1883). See also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 242-43 (1894). For a discussion of the theory and purpose of cross-examination, see
generally 5 WIGMORE, supra, § 1368.
3. Cross-examination has been described as "the greatest legal engine ever invented
for the discovery of truth." 5 WIrMORE, supra note 2, § 1367.
4. "Confrontation also involves a subordinate and incidental advantage, namely, the
observation by the tribunal of the witness' demeanor on the stand, as a minor means of
judging the value of his testimony. But this minor advantage is not regarded as essential, i.e.
it may be dispensed with when it is not feasible." Id. § 1365.
5. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (disclosure of witness' juvenile record
deemed to be outweighed by the right of confrontation); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
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Pointer v. Texas,6 the Court held that the right of confrontation is
a "fundamental right" made binding upon the states through the
fourteenth amendment. The failure to allow a criminal defendant
the opportunity to cross-examine an adverse witness is therefore a
denial of due process of law.7
The holding in Pointer was applied in Douglas v. Alabama,8
decided the same day as Pointer. Douglas reversed a state court
conviction holding that the introduction of an accomplice'se con-
fession implicating the defendant was in violation of the defen-
dant's right of confrontation because the defendant was not af-
forded the opportunity to cross-examine the witness against him. 0
284 (1973) (state "voucher" rule prohibiting defendant from cross-examining his own wit-
ness for impeachment purposes held to be a violation of the sixth amendment confrontation
clause); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (introduction of a witness' transcript from a
preliminary hearing without a good-faith showing of unavailability was a denial of defen-
dant's right of confrontation even though he had the opportunity to cross-examine the wit-
ness at the preliminary hearing); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968) (right of confronta-
tion violated where defendant not permitted to ask the witness his real name and where he
was residing at the time of trial); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) (right of confron-
tation denied when defendant's accomplice refused to answer questions-claiming the privi-
lege against self-incrimination-and his confession was read to the court under the guise of
refreshing the witness' memory); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right of confronta-
tion denied when witness' transcript from a preliminary hearing was introduced into evi-
dence at trial and defendant did not cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing).
See generally McCORMICK, supra note 2, at § 19; 5 WIGMORE, supra note 2, at §§ 1390-1394.
Although the confrontation clause is expressly applicable to criminal prosecutions, its basic
principles are so important to the rights and freedoms of an individual that it has been
extended to non-criminal cases as well. See, e.g., Wilner v. Committee on Character and
Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
6. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
7. Id. at 405. In the opinion for the Court, Justice Black wrote: "There are few sub-
jects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous
than in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and cross-examination is
an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's
constitutional goal. Indeed, we have expressly declared that to deprive an accused of the
right to cross-examine the witnesses against him is a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of due process of law." Id. See generally Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964
Term, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56, 144 (1965); Smith, Criminal Law-Sixth Amendment Right of
Confrontation-Obligatory in State Proceedings, 6 WASHBURN L.J. 171 (1966); Note, Due
Process-Accused's Right to Confront Witness Against Him is Obligatory on
States-Pointer v. Texas (United States Supreme Court, 1965), 30 ALB. L. REV. 151 (1966);
Note, Right of Confrontation Applied to the States, 19 U. MIAMI L. REv. 500 (1965); Note,
Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434 (1966).
8. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
9. For purposes of this Note, the term "accomplice" refers to multiple defendants
tried in separate trials, while the term "codefendant" refers to multiple defendants tried in
a joint trial. See note 12 infra.
10. 380 U.S. at 416-17. The prosecution called an accomplice of the defendant to the
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Reversing the defendant's conviction was required because of the
prejudicial effect that the accomplice's confession might have had
on the jury where the defendant had not been allowed, through
cross-examination of the witness, "to test the truth of the state-
ment itself.""
A situation analogous to that presented in Douglas is that of a
joint trial12 in which a codefendant's s confession implicating the
defendant is introduced at trial although the codefendant does not
testify in person. In Bruton v. United States,14 the Court held that
the admission of a codefendant's confession under circumstances
in which the codefendant is beyond the reach of the defendant's
cross-examination violated the defendant's right of confrontation,
despite cautionary instructions to the jury to disregard the confes-
sion except as against its maker. 5 Thus, any extrajudicial state-
ment made by a codefendant which implicated another defendant
had to be excluded if the defendant was not afforded the opportu-
nity to cross-examine the codefendant.
The Bruton rule was subsequently limited by the Supreme
Court's harmless error rule in Harrington v. California.'6 In Har-
rington the Court established that in the event of a Bruton error,
an appellate court is required to determine whether the constitu-
tional violation was rendered harmless by other circumstances. If
witness stand, but the-accomplice refused to answer questions, invoking his fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination. The prosecution then produced a confession of the
accomplice--which incriminated the defendant-and read it to the court, in the presence of
the jury, under the guise of refreshing the witness' memory. Although technically the confes-
sion was merely an exhibit and was not introduced into evidence, it was nevertheless before
the jury. The defendant subsequently was convicted without having had the opportunity to
cross-examine the witness in regard to his confession.
11. Id. at 420.
12. See FED. R. CRmm. P. 8. Subsection (b) of the rule states: "Two or more defendants
may be charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have partici-
pated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting
an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or
separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count." "The purpose of
Rule 8(b) is to balance the need to avoid the potential prejudice that may result from join-
ing multiple defendants with the need to attain trial efficiency." United States v. Adams,
581 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978). See generally Orfield, A
Note on Joinder of Offenses, 41 ORE. L. REv. 128 (1962); Note, Joinder of Defendants In
Criminal Prosecutions, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 513 (1967); Note, Joint and Single Trials Under
Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 553 (1965).
13. See note 9 supra.
14. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
15. Id. at 126.
16. 395 U.S. 250 (1969). See notes 55-58 & accompanying text infra.
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the error is found to be harmless, the conviction must be upheld. If
the error is not considered harmless, reversal is required.
In the recent case of Parker v. Randolph,'7 a plurality of the
Supreme Court 18 held that if a defendant's confession "interlocks"
with a codefendant's confession, 9 the admission into evidence of
the codefendant's statement does not violate the right of confron-
tation so long as a limiting instruction is given to the jury. The
plurality departs from the established Bruton-harmless error anal-
ysis20 by establishing a rigid per se rule in those cases in which a
defendant has made an interlocking confession. Four members of
the Court rejected the interlocking confessions doctrine, however,
thereby leaving the Court evenly divided as to which of the two
rationales, the Bruton-harmless error approach or the interlocking
confessions doctrine, is applicable in interlocking confession cases.
The purpose of this Note is to determine whether the United
States Supreme Court in its recent decision in Parker, adequately
protects each codefendant's right of confrontation. The Note ini-
tially sets forth the rationale of Bruton, which established the inef-
fectiveness of limiting instructions in safeguarding codefendant
confrontation rights, and discusses the application of the harmless
error rule to codefendant confession cases prior to Parker. The ori-
gin of the interlocking confessions doctrine and the divergent ap-
proaches within the circuits which led to the granting of certiorari
in Parker then are traced. Next, the Note analyzes the Parker plu-
rality's holding that the introduction of interlocking confessions is
nonviolative of the constitutional right of confrontation.
Finally, the Note concludes that there is little justification for
the Parker plurality's departure from the Bruton-harmless error
approach in deciding interlocking confession cases. The plurality's
reasoning is not only erroneous, but proposes a per se approach
which may prove to be difficult and unfair in its application. Be-
17. 442 U.S. 62 (1979). See notes 69-118 & accompanying text infra. See also 65
A.B.A.J. 1093 (1979).
18. The plurality consisted of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, White,
and Stewart. Justice Blackmun concurred in the result reached in the plurality opinion but
did not adopt the plurality's rationale. The dissent consisted of Justices Stevens, Brennan,
and Marshall. Justice Powell took no part in the case.
19. See notes 60-67 & accompanying text infra.
20. For purposes of this Note, the "Bruton-harmless error approach" refers to the
method of review used by appellate courts in deciding codefendant confession cases prior to
the adoption by some courts of the interlocking confessions doctrine. See notes 52-58 &
accompanying ,text infra.
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cause the Court is evenly divided on the issue, with four members
adopting the interlocking confessions doctrine and four members
upholding the Bruton-harmless error approach, lower courts may
continue to apply either rationale in deciding codefendant confes-
sion cases, including those in which interlocking confessions have
been made. This Note finds the harmless error approach preferable
because it strictly protects a defendant's confrontation rights, ex-
cept where a violation is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Bruton Rule
The "Bruton rule" was established in Bruton v. United
States,21 in which the Supreme Court overruled Delli Paoli v.
United States,22 and with it, the validity of using limiting instruc-
tions as a means of protecting a defendant's confrontation rights.23
In Delli Paoli, five defendants were charged with conspiring to sell
alcohol unlawfully. At a joint trial, the confession of one of the
defendants, implicating the other codefendants in the crime
charged, was introduced into evidence with limiting instructions to
the jury to consider the confession only against the confessor.2
None of the defendants took the stand, and all were subsequently
convicted; one defendant appealed.25
The Court in Delli Paoli considered whether the limiting in-
structions of the trial court were adequate to protect the appel-
lant's confrontation rights although he had not been afforded the
21. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
22. 352 U.S. 232 (1957). See also Marcus, The Confrontation Clause and Co-Defen-
dant Confessions: The Drift From Bruton to Parker v. Randolph, U. ILL. L.F. 559, 561-62
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Marcus].
23. 391 U.S. at 126.
24. 352 U.S. at 233-34. The confession was not admissible against any codefendant
because of the hearsay rule. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, §§ 244-253; 8 MooRE's FEDERAL
PRAc'rcE § 14.04[2] (2d ed. 1979); 5 WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 1360-1365. Nor was the
confession admissible against any codefendant under the coconspirator exception to the
hearsay rule. The Court in Delli Paoli stated: "[A] declaration made by one conspirator, in
furtherance of a conspiracy and prior to its termination, may be used against the other
conspirators. However, when such a declaration is made by a conspirator after the termina-
tion of the conspiracy, it may be used only against the declarant and under appropriate
instructions to the jury." 352 U.S. at 237. See also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.
440 (1949); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946). The confession was admissible,
however, against the confessor under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule. See gen-
erally MCCORMCK, supra note 2, § 262; 5 WIGMORE supra note 2, §§ 1048-1050; Morgan,
Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L.J. 355 (1921).
25. 352 U.S. at 233.
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opportunity to cross-examine the confessing codefendant. The test
the Court applied was "whether the instructions were sufficiently
clear and whether it was reasonably possible for the jury to follow
them. '2 6 In finding that the admission of the codefendant's confes-
sion did not constitute reversible error, the Court determined that
the instructions had indeed been clear and that the jury had been
capable of understanding and following them. Despite the Court's
conclusion, however, its position that the defendant's confronta-
tion rights had not been violated was somewhat weakened by its
own acknowledgement that, exclusive of the confession, there had
been sufficient evidence against the defendant.28
Delli Paoli was a reaffirmation of the belief that jury members
are capable of following the instructions of a judge2 and of dis-
missing from their minds any prejudicial matter against a defen-
dant when considering the defendant's guilt or innocence. The
Court expressly noted: "Unless we proceed on the basis that the
jury will follow the court's instructions where those instructions
are clear and the circumstances are such that the jury can reasona-
bly be expected to follow them, the jury system makes little
sense."30
Delli Paoli's dissent, however, is a biting attack on this "basic
premise" of the jury system:
The fact of the matter is that too often such admonition
26. Id. at 239.
27. Id. at 240-41. In Delli Paoli, the standard established for determining whether the
jury was capable of following the trial court's limiting instructions included: (1) whether the
nature of the crime and the role of each defendant was easily understood; (2) whether the
interest of each defendant was repeatedly emphasized by the court throughout the trial; (3)
whether the codefendant's confession was introduced at the end of the trial in order to
separate it from the rest of the testimony; (4) whether the confession itself merely corrobo-
rated the evidence against the multiple defendants; and (5) whether there was anything in
the record to indicate that the jury was not able to follow the cautionary instructions. Id. at
241-42.
28. The Court stated: "In considering the admissibility of the. . . confession, we start
with the premise that the other evidence against petitioner was sufficient to sustain his
conviction." Id. at 236. The Court implied that even if the jury had not followed the trial
court's instructions, the conviction would still have been upheld. The Supreme Court was
not fashioning a harmless error rule, however, and would not do so until Chapman v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), ten years later. See notes 52-58 & accompanying text infra. Pre-
sumably the Court in Delli Paoli drew attention to the other evidence against the defendant
in order to strengthen and to justify its position that a jury is capable of following limiting
instructions. See also 8 MooRn's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 14.04[2], at 14-59 n.2 (2d ed. 1979).
29. See also Marcus, supra note 22, at 565-66.
30. 352 U.S. at 242.
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against misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such
a nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of
the jurors. The admonition therefore becomes a futile collocation
of words and fails of its purpose as a legal protection to defen-
dants against whom such a declaration should not tell.s '
Following Delli Paoli, both state and federal lower courts ex-
pressed the view that limiting instructions could not be assumed as
always adequate to protect a criminal defendant's confrontation
rights.3 2 An indication that the Supreme Court itself was moving
away from the holding in Delli Paoli can be seen in the case of
Jackson v. Denno.5 Jackson involved a New York state procedure
whereby the jury was required to determine the voluntariness of a
defendant's confession as well as his or her guilt. The Court struck
down the procedure on the grounds that the jury could not deter-
mine a confession to have been involuntary and at the same time
perform the mental exercise of disregarding its contents against
the accused.3 4 Although Jackson was concerned with the voluntari-
ness of a confession, it reflected the Supreme Court's shift in view
away from the effectiveness of limiting instructions as a means of
safeguarding sixth amendment confrontation rights.s5
31. Id. at 246. Most commentators also were critical of the Delli Paoli decision. See,
e.g., Comment, Post-conspiracy Admissions in Joint Prosecutions-Effectiveness of In-
structions Limiting the Use of Evidence to One Co-defendant, 24 U. CHi. L. REV. 710
(1957); Note, Joinder of Defendants in Criminal Prosecutions, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 513, 520-
25 (1967). But see Note, Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REV.
920, 990 (1959) (stating that the view taken in Delli Paoli is preferable because "it recog-
nizes the necessity of weighing the declarant's interest in admitting the confession in a joint
trial against the policy of avoiding prejudice to codefendants").
32. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Floyd v. Wilkins, 367 F.2d 990, 993-94 (2d Cir.
1966); United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 215-20 (2d Cir. 1966); Greenwell v. United
States, 336 F.2d 962, 968-69 (D.C. Cir. 1964); People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265,
47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965); State v. Young, 46 N.J. 152, 215 A.2d 352 (1965).
33. 378 U.S. 368 (1964). When the Court finally overruled Delli Paoli in Bruton, it
cited the Jackson decision as the initial step in repudiating the assumption that limiting
instructions were adequate to protect a defendant's right of confrontation. 391 U.S. at 128.
34. 378 U.S. at 388-89.
35. In a California case examining the effectiveness of limiting instructions in code-
fendant situations, Chief Justice Traynor referred to the Jackson decision: "if it is a denial
of due process to rely on a jury's presumed ability to disregard an involuntary confession, it
may also be a denial of due process to rely on a jury's presumed ability to disregard a
codefendant's confession implicating another defendant when it is determining that defen-
dant's guilt or innocence ....
"In joint trials... [a] jury cannot 'segregate evidence into separate intellectual boxes'
.... It cannot determine that a confession is true insofar as it admits that A has commit-
ted criminal acts with B and at the same time effectively ignore the inevitable conclusion
that B has committed those same criminal acts with A." People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518,
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In Bruton v. United States,"8 the Court reconsidered the issue
of whether limiting instructions in joint trials sufficiently protected
a defendant's confrontation rights and overruled Delli Paoli. In
Bruton, defendants Bruton and Evans were convicted at a joint
trial of armed postal robbery. A postal inspector who had interro-
gated Evans testified that Evans had confessed and had implicated
Bruton in the robbery. The trial court issued instructions to the
jury to consider the confession only against Evans.3
7
The Supreme Court reversed Bruton's conviction, holding that
"because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions
to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial state-
ments in determining petitioner's guilt, admission of Evans' con-
fession in this joint trial violated petitioner's right of cross-exami-
nation secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment."3 " In support of its decision, the Court reemphasized
the importance of the constitutional right given to criminal defen-
dants to cross-examine witnesses 9 and noted the significant body
of case law reflecting disapproval of the Delli Paoli assumptions.40
528-29, 407 P.2d 265, 271-72, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 359-60 (1965). Aranda was cited with ap-
proval by the Court in Bruton. 391 U.S. at 130. See generally Lachs, People v. Aranda is
Alive and Well and Living in California, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 264 (1974).
36. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). See also Marcus, supra note 22, at 562-69.
37. Both defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
versed as to Evans on the grounds that his oral confession should not have been introduced
into evidence against him. 391 U.S. at 124. The oral confession of Evans was obtained with-
out prior warnings and without counsel as required under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), and thus had to be excluded. 391 U.S. at 124 n.1. Bruton's conviction was affirmed,
however, because the circuit court relied on the holding in Delli Paoli that a judge's instruc-
tion to the jury to disregard inadmissible hearsay evidence against Bruton was adequate to
protect him from any possible prejudicial effects of Evans' confession. Id. at 124-25. See
notes 27-30 & accompanying text supra.
38. 391 U.S. at 126. See generally Comment, Admissibility of Confession of Codefend-
ant, 60 J. CraM. L.C. & P.S. 195 (1969); Comment, Confrontation: Prior Testimony, Confes-
sions and the Sixth Amendment, 36 TENN. L. REv. 382 (1969); Comment, The Right of
Confrontation and the Use of Non-Testifying Codefendants' Confessions: Constitutional
Law in Microcosm, 26 U. MImi L. REv. 755 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Comment]; Coni-
ment, Evidence-Admission of Codefendant's Confession; Prejudicial Error, 8 WASHBURN
L.J. 381, (1969); Note, Codefendants' Confessions, 3 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 80 (1967).
39. 391 U.S. at 126-27. See notes 1-10 & accompanying text supra.
40. 391 U.S. at 128-31. See notes 32-35 & accompanying text supra. The Court in
Bruton also cited Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as being in accordance
with its decision. 391 U.S. at 131-32. Rule 14 states: "If it appears that a defendant or the
government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or infor-
mation or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate
trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice
requires. In ruling on a motion by a defendant for severance the court may order the attor-
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The Court in Bruton successfully challenged three major argu-
ments which had supported the Court's prior position in Delli
Paoli: (1) that the admission of a codefendant's confession without
the opportunity of cross-examination but with limiting instructions
from the trial judge is in furtherance of the truth-determining pro-
cess; (2) that joint trials provide for numerous economic and judi-
cial benefits which should not be discarded by the requirement of
separate trials; and (3) that unless there is faith that the jury can
and will follow instructions from a judge, the integrity of the jury
as a deliberative and truth-determining body is called into
question. 1
First, the Court held that although the admission of a code-
fendant's confession, subject to limiting instructions, might be of
benefit in the truth-determining process, "it overlooks alternative
ways of achieving that benefit without at the same time infringing
the nonconfessor's right of confrontation. Where viable alterna-
tives do exist, it is deceptive to rely on the pursuit of truth to de-
fend a clearly harmful practice.
'4 2
ney for the government to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements or
confessions made by the defendants which the government intends to introduce in evidence
at the trial." Fen. R. CRni. P. 14 (1980). Commenting on the purpose of the rule, the Advi-
sory Committee stated: "A defendant may be prejudiced by the admission in evidence
against a co-defendant of a statement or confession made by that co-defendant. This
prejudice cannot be dispelled by cross-examination if the co-defendant does not take the
stand. Limiting instructions to the jury may not in fact erase the prejudice ... ." Id. Rule 14
is therefore a protective measure, within the discretion of the court, designed to safeguard a
defendant in a joint trial from the prejudicial effects of a codefendant's confession or state-
ment. Id. See generally 8 MooRE'S FnEsuma PRACTICE §§ 14.01-.05 (2d ed. 1979).
41. 391 U.S. at 132-36. See notes 22-23 & accompanying text supra.
42. 391 U.S. at 133-34 (footnote omitted). The Court does not specify what these "via-
ble alternatives" might be. In a footnote, the Court does mention the process of redac-
tion-deleting all references in a confession to codefendants-but also seems to imply that
this technique is ineffective as a safeguard to a defendant's confrontation rights. Id. at 134
n.10. See generally Comment, supra note 38, at 757-58; Note, Codefendants' Confessions, 3
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROn. 80, 88-90 (1967); Comment, Post-conspiracy Admissions in Joint
Prosecutions-Effectiveness of Instructions Limiting the Use of Evidence to One Co-defen-
dant, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 710, 713 (1957); Note, Joinder of Defendants in Criminal Prosecu-
tions, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 513, 523-25 (1967). Other courts and commentators have suggested
various alternatives. See, e.g., United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 11&7-70 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1127 (1973) (the Ninth Circuit, although not endorsing any
scheme, upheld the use of two juries in a joint trial to avoid a Bruton problem); United
States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 324 (2d Cir. 1956), af'd, 352 U.S. 232 (1957) (Judge
Frank, dissenting, proposed a "sevei or exclude" rule); People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518,
530-31, 407 P.2d 265, 272-73, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 360-61 (1965) (Chief Justice Traynor pro-
posed a test similar to that of Judge Frank); Note, Codefendants' Confessions, 3 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 80, 92-93 (1967) (proposal for a modified joint trial); Note, The Admission
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Second, the Court defended against the contention that the
Bruton rule would necessarily create a greater number of sever-
ances in joint trials.43 The Court agreed that joint trials did "'con-
serve state funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public
authorities, and avoid delays in bringing those accused of crime to
trial' ,,;4 however, it also stated that to permit the judicial proce-
dure advocated in Delli Paoli would be to "secure greater speed,
economy and convenience in the administration of the law at the
price of fundamental principles of constitutional liberty. That
price is too high.' 45 The Court therefore held that the constitu-
tional rights of confrontation and due process of law clearly out-
weighed considerations of judicial economy.
Third, in answer to the Delli Paoli argument that to rule out
the use of limiting instructions in joint trials would be to under-
mine the very basis of the jury system, the Court in Bruton stated:
Not every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evi-
dence can be considered to be reversible error unavoidable
through limiting instructions; instances occur in almost every trial
where inadmissible evidence creeps in, usually inadvertently ....
It is not unreasonable to conclude that in many such cases the
jury can and will follow the trial judge's instructions to disregard
such information. Nevertheless . . . there are some contexts in
which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions
is so great and the consequences of failure so vital to the defen-
dant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system
cannot be ignored.
46
of a Codefendant's Confession After Bruton v. United States: The Questions and a Propo-
sal for Their Resolution, 1980 DUKE L.J. 329, 347-50 (proposal for a three-stage procedure
involving pretrial deletions of confessions, a voir dire process during trial, and two alternate
methods of appeal). See generally Taylor, Codefendant's Confession in a Joint Trial, 35
Mo. L. REv. 125 (1970).
43. If the prosecution in a joint trial requires the introduction of a codefendant's con-
fession in order to prove its case against that codefendant, then under Bruton the joint trial,
in some situations, would have to be severed in order to protect other codefendants from
being prejudiced by such an admission. There are, however, alternatives to severing a joint
trial. See note 37 supra.
44. 391 U.S. at 134.
45. Id. at 135 (citing People v. Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419, 432, 164 N.E. 336, 341 (1928)).
See generally Note, Codefendants' Confessions, 3 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 80, 91-92
(1967) (suggesting that a "sever or exclude" policy would not necessarily cause the judicial
system to incur as significant an expense in time and money as might be believed). See also
Singer, Admissibility of Confession of Codefendant, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 195, 199 (1969).
46. 391 U.S. at 135. Cf. Singer, Admissibility of Confession of Codefendant, 60 J.
CraM. L.C. & P.S. 195, 200 (1969) ("[i]f the jury is the conscience of the community, relying
on its extra-legal experience, perceptions, and common sense, then, necessarily, it sometimes
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The Court therefore recognized a limited capacity of the jury to
follow the instructions of the trial court regarding the significance
of criminal confessions.4 7 To extend beyond that limited capacity
would be to subject the defense of a criminal defendant to harmful
evidence without an opportunity to test the truth of that evidence
through cross-examination.
The final rationale given by the Court in overturning Delli
Paoli was based upon the very nature of codefendants' confessions.
The Court recognized that codefendants often will attempt to shift
the blame for a crime to others.48 Thus a codefendant's confession
should always be admitted with caution and with the knowledge
that the statement may lack substantial reliability.49 The Court
stated that where the confessor has not been cross-examined, the
"unreliability of such evidence is intolerably compounded," 50 and
implied that the risk that such unconfronted, uncontroverted evi-
dence by a codefendant would influence the jurors when consider-
ing the guilt of a defendant is very great. The Court therefore con-
cluded that a limiting instruction was not an adequate substitute
for a defendant's constitutional right of cross-examination and
that the effect was "the same as if there had been no instruction at
all."251L
The Harmless Error Rule
In Chapman v. California,52 the Court held that "there may
be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular
case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent
with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring
the automatic reversal of the conviction. 5 3 Chapman established
will act outside its narrow legal role but still within the bounds of justice").
47. But see note 59 & accompanying text infra.
48. 391 U.S. at 136.
49. See notes 107-13 & accompanying text infra.
50. 391 U.S. at 136.
51. Id. at 137.
52. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
53. Id. at 22. The Court in Chapman relied upon a test established in Fahy v. Con-
necticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963). "The question is whether there is a reasonable possibil-
ity that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." 386 U.S. at
23. In other words, if the damaging evidence were at all likely to enter into the consideration
of the verdict by the jury, then the error would not be harmless and reversal would be
necessary.
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that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless,
the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt.""
The harmless error rule was applied to a codefendant confes-
sion situation in Harrington v. California.5 5 In a joint trial, defen-
dant Harrington and three codefendants were convicted of at-
tempted robbery and first-degree murder under California's felony
murder rule. Each of the three codefendants confessed to the
crime, and the confessions were introduced at trial with limiting
instructions from the trial judge to consider the confessions only
against each respective confessor. One codefendant took the stand,
and Harrington had the opportunity to cross-examine him. How-
ever, the other two codefendants did not testify. All of the defen-
dants were subsequently convicted.56
The Supreme Court upheld Harrington's conviction, holding
that the confessions were merely "cumulative" evidence against
him, and that even exclusive of the confessions, "[t]he case against
Harrington was so overwhelming that we conclude that this viola-
tion of Bruton was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt .. .
Thus, under Harrington, the admission of a defendant's confession
implicating codefendants is not always grounds for reversing a con-
viction as proposed in Bruton. As long as other evidence intro-
54. 386 U.S. at 24. See generally Bybee, A Comment on Application of the Harmless
Constitutional Error Rule to "Confession" Cases, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 144; Clark, Harmless
Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REV. 83 (1967).
55. 395 U.S. 250 (1969). See also Marcus, supra note 22, at 569-70.
56. 395 U.S. at 252.
57. Id. at 254 (emphasis added). There has been some dispute as to whether Harring-
ton actually applied the harmless error test set forth in Chapman, even though the Court
stated that it was reaffirming its position in Chapman. Id. at 255. Whereas Chapman de-
clared that a Bruton error would not be harmless if there was "a reasonable possibility" that
the jury considered a codefendant's confession in spite of limiting instructions, Harrington
held that where other evidence presented a case "so overwhelming" against the defendant,
exclusive of extrajudicial statements by a codefendant, then the violation of Bruton would
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Brennan, dissenting, stated that Harrington
actually overruled Chapman in holding that in order for an "error to be 'harmless' it must
have made no contribution to a criminal conviction." Id. at 155. In fact, there has been some
confusion as to whether there are actually separate harmless error tests as espoused in
Chapman and Harrington respectively. See Comment, supra note 38, at 766-68; Note, The
Admission of a Codefendant's Confession After Bruton v. United States: The Questions
and A Proposal for Their Resolution, 1980 DuKE L.J. 329, 338-39, 345-47. Cf. Schneble v.
Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430-32 (1972) (admission of codefendant's statement corroborating
defendant's own statement held harmless error in view of overwhelming evidence, citing
both Chapman and Harrington).
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duced at trial is so overwhelming as to be sufficient to convict a
defendant, any Bruton error is considered harmless. 5
Breaking Away From Bruton and Harrington
Although Bruton was highly critical of the use of limiting in-
structionjs as a means of protecting a defendant's right of cross-
examination, the Court refused to make its prohibition absolute.
Rather, it conceded that there are "many circumstances" in which
the jury could be relied upon to follow the instructions of the trial
judge.
59
Following Bruton, various exceptions restricting either the ap-
plicability or the scope of the Bruton rule were developed by the
lower courts as well as by the Supreme Court.60 One such excep-
tion was established in cases where a defendant personally con-
fesses, and the confession is introduced into evidence along with
those of codefendants. The justification for distinguishing Bruton
in this situation is based on the claim that any prejudicial effects
from a codefendant's confession are insignificant because the de-
fendant has confessed to the crime charged. This is the "interlock-
ing confessions" doctrine,61 and it was first developed by the Sec-
58. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973). See note 74 infra.
59. 391 U.S. at 135. The Court, however, did not suggest what these "circumstances"
might be.
60. See Note, The Second Circuit's Exceptions To Bruton v. United States: The
Need for a Reexamination, 29 SYRAcusE L. REv. 793 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note]. The
Supreme Court fashioned several exceptions of its own. See, e.g., Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S.
622, 626-30 (1971) (the admission' of an extrajudicial statement made by a codefendant, with
limiting instructions, was held not to be a violation of Bruton where the codefendant took
the stand and denied having made the statement which implicated the defendant, even
though there could have been no effective cross-examinati6n of the statement itself unless
the codefendant had affirmed the statement as his); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970)
(the introduction of an accomplice's out of court statement in a separate trial which impli-
cated the defendant was held to be neither a violation of the sixth amendment right of
confrontation nor of Bruton, because under state law hearsay evidence made during the
concealment phase of a conspiracy is admissible and because the witness who introduced
the statement was subject to cross-examination); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 733-37
(1969) (the introduction of a codefendant's expected testimony by defense counsel during
his opening statement, cautioned with limiting instructions, was not deemed a violation of
Bruton even though the codefendant did not subsequently take the witness stand for direct
or cross-examination). See generally 76 DIcK. L. REv. 354 (1972); Note, The Admission of A
Codefendant's Confession After Bruton v. United States: The Questions and a Proposal for
their Resolution, 1970 DuKz L.J. 329, 336-44 (1970); Comment, supra note 38, at 765, 768-
61. See also Marcus, supra note 22, at 580-81.
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ond Circuit in United States ex rel. Catanzaro v. Mancusi.
2
The Second Circuit held Bruton inapplicable, distinguishing
Catanzaro on the fact that the defendant in Bruton had not made
a confession."8 "Where the jury has heard not only a codefendant's
confession but the defendant's own confession no such 'devastat-
ing' risk attends the lack of confrontation as was thought to be
involved in Bruton."" The rationale of the Second Circuit was
that the risk of harm to a defendant, resulting from an inability to
cross-examine a codefendant whose confession inculpates the de-
fendant, was not likely to be so damaging or influential upon the
jury where a defendant had confessed as well.
In holding Bruton inapplicable, Catanzaro is significant not
only for creating an exception to the Bruton rule but for breaking
with the harmless error approach established in Harrington.5 In-
stead of considering whether the other evidence presented at the
trial was "so overwhelming" that the admission of the codefend-
ant's confession would have constituted harmless error, the Second
Circuit chose to create a new rule, holding that any resulting
prejudice would not affect the jury's determination because the de-
fendant's own confession was also squarely before them." What
62. 404 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 942 (1970). At a joint trial,
defendant Catanzaro and two codefendants were convicted of first-degree murder during the
robbery of a United Parcel Service truck. 404 F.2d at 298-99. Incriminating statements
made by Catanzaro to the police were introduced at trial, along with the confession of one of
the codefendants which also implicated Catanzaro in the crime. Id. at 299-300. On appeal,
the defendant claimed that the admission of his codefendant's confession was in violation of
Bruton. Catanzaro applied for a writ of habeas corpus on two separate occasions. The first
was on the grounds that (1) his confessions had been made involuntarily, (2) his hotel room
had been illegally searched, and (3) one of the prosecution's key witnesses had perjured
himself. Id. at 297. The second writ was based on a claim that the joint trial was a denial of
the right to a fair trial. Id. at 298. Both writs were denied and appealed. See Note, supra
note 60, at 803.
63. 404 F.2d at 300.
64. Id. "The basic premise of the interlocking confession doctrine is that when confes-
sions coincide on vital points, the confession of a nontestifying codefendant can add nothing
to what is already in evidence." Note, supra note 60 at 793, 804.
65. See notes 52-58 & accompanying text supra.
66. Indeed, had the Second Circuit applied Bruton and Harrington, the court might
have been unable to find the other evidence against Catanzaro to be "overwhelming." If
Catanzaro's confession had been found to-be involuntary, as he asserted, and if the code-
fendant's confession had been excluded under Bruton, then the prosecution's case would
have rested primarily on the testimony of an eyewitness whose credibility was substantially
lacking (the eyewitness had been convicted three times for theft and robber6, had given
inconsistent accounts of the crime, and had perjured himself on the stand). 404 F.2d at 300.
The results under Bruton and Harrington thus might have differed substantially.
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the Second Circuit failed to do, however, was to define exactly
what an interlocking confession is and when the doctrine is to
apply.87
Although several cases adopted the interlocking confessions
doctrine in codefendant confession cases, s other courts chose to
follow the path the Supreme Court had established in Bruton and
Harrington. The Sixth Circuit in Hodges v. Rosee9 expressly re-
jected the interlocking confessions doctrine stating:
We . . . reject the notion . . . that [codefendants'] state-
ments might both be admissible because they "interlock" or agree
on important parts of the crime. Although this view has been
67. See notes 117-23 & accompanying text infra.
68. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Stanbridge v. Zelker, 514 F.2d 45, 48-50 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 872 (1975); United States ex rel. Duff v. Zelker, 452 F.2d 1009, 1010
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972). But cf. United States ex rel. Ortiz v. Fritz,
476 F.2d 37, 38-40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973) (a panel of the Second Cir-
cuit doubted the soundness of the interlocking confessions doctrine but nevertheless applied
it because it felt bound by that circuit's decision in Catanzaro). See note 112 infra.
69. 570 F.2d 643 (6th Cir. 1978). At a joint trial defendants Hodges and Lewis were
convicted of murder in the perpetration of rape. Both defendants made written confessions
as to the rape, but each blamed the other for beating the victim and causing her death. Id.
at 645. Both confessions were redacted and introduced at the trial. See note 34 supra. In
this case, the redaction was effectuated by inserting blanks where mention of a codefendant
was made. 570 F.2d at 645. The court noted that a Bruton error could be "avoided in some
cases by eliminating from the extrajudicial statement all references to defendants other than
the declarant, and properly cautioning the jury against use of the statement in determining
the guilt of those defendants." Id. at 646 (citing United States v. Hicks, 524 F.2d 1001 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 953 (1976); United States v. Wingate, 520 F.2d 309 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1074 (1976); United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 914 (1975); United States v. English, 501 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1114 (1975)). Lewis took the witness stand in his own defense, but
Hodges did not testify. Thus Lewis had no opportunity to cross-examine him as to the in-
criminating written statement. Limiting instructions were given by the trial court directing
the jury not to consider the confessions in determining guilt except against the confessor.
570 F.2d at 645.
Both defendants appealed their convictions, claiming denial of their sixth amendment
right of confrontation and arguing that the trial court had erred in admitting their confes-
sions. Id. Because defendant Lewis had taken the stand, the court for the Sixth Circuit
found that no Bruton error had occurred as to Hodges, who had full opportunity to cross-
examine Lewis. Id. at 646. See also Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 627-30 (1971). In Nelson,
the codefendant's incriminating statement was introduced at trial. On the witness stand,
however, he denied making the statement and thus could not be cross-examined in regard to
it. The Court held that sixth amendment confrontation rights had not been violated. See
note 60 supra.
As to Lewis, however, the court found that the redaction deleting his name had been
ineffective. Thus there had been a Bruton error, regardless of the fact that Lewis' own con-
fession was in evidence-the very distinction upon which the Second Circuit had relied in
Catanzaro. 570 F.2d at 646-47. See notes 62-67 & accompanying text supra.
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adopted by some courts... we do not think it is consistent with
the Bruton rule .... The fact that codefendant statements, taken
before trial, may agree on certain points does not necessarily viti-
ate the need for cross-examination.7
0
After rejecting the interlocking confessions doctrine and hold-
ing that a Bruton error had occurred, the court in Hodges applied
the harmless error test set forth in Harrington v. California. '
The court in Hodges thus followed the precise rules prescribed
by the Supreme Court when confronted with the admission of an
inculpating extrajudicial statement.2 Several other circuits also
impliedly rejected the interlocking confessions doctrine by follow-
ing the harmless error analysis instead.73 The Supreme Court
70. 570 F.2d at 647-48. The court further stated: "In this case, Appellant Lewis took
the position at trial that his statement was coercively obtained. He repudiated the state-
ment in his testimony, claiming that he was not near [the scene of the crime] on the night of
the murder. Although this testimony was seriously lacking in credibility, it did contradict all
of those important points upon which Lewis' and Hodges' extra-judicial statements agreed.
Cross-examination of Hodges was thus arguably of importance under Lewis' theory of de-
fense. Certainly the 'jurors were entitled to have the benefit of the defense theory before
them so that they could make an informed judgment as to the weight to place' on Hodges'
statement." Id. at 648.
71. Id. See notes 52-58 & accompanying text supra. In evaluating the other evidence
presented at the trial, exclusive of the codefendant's confession implicating Lewis, the court
found that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 570 F.2d at 648-49.
72. For another case which expressly rejected the interlocking confessions doctrine, see
United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972, 981-83 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038
(1977).
73. See, e.g., Hall v. Wolff, 539 F.2d 1146, 1148-49 (8th Cir. 1976); Glinsey v. Parker,
491 F.2d 337, 340-44 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); United States v. Brown,
452 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Ignacio v. Guam, 413 F.2d 513, 515-
16 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943 (1970); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Ye-
ager, 399 F.2d 508, 510-11 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1027 (1969). Other cases
have applied both the interlocking confessions exception and the harmless error approach.
These cases have held essentially that even if error was committed in admitting a codefend-
ait's confession under the interlocking confessions doctrine, "additional corroborating evi-
dence may make the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Fleming,
594 F.2d 598, 603 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 931 (1979). See, e.g., United States v.
Walton, 538 F.2d 1348, 1353-54 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025 (1976); Mack v. Mag-
gio, 538 F.2d 1129, 1130 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Spinks, 470 F.2d 64, 65-66 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972); Metropolis v. Turner, 437 F.2d 207, 208-09 (10th
Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Dukes v. Wallack, 414 F.2d 246, 247 (2d Cir. 1969).
There has been confusion within the state courts as well. See, e.g., Stewart v. Arkansas,
257 Ark. 753, 519 S.W.2d 733 (1975) (holding Bruton inapplicable and applying the inter-
locking confessions doctrine); Connecticut v. Oliver, 160 Conn. 85, 273 A.2d 867 (1970) (ap-
plying both the harmless error rule and the interlocking confessions doctrine); People v.
Rosochacki, 41 MI. 2d 483, 244 N.E.2d 136 (1969) (applying the harmless error approach);
People v. Moll, 26 N.Y.2d 1, 256 N.E.2d 185, 307 N.Y.S.2d 876, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 911
(1970) (applying the harmless error rule, but citing the interlocking confessions doctrine in
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sought to resolve this division in various circuits when it granted
certiorari to hear the case of Parker v. Randolph.7
4
Parker v. Randolph: Turning Back Bruton
Parker involved five defendants tried at a joint trial for mur-
der during the commission of a robbery under Tennessee's felony
murder rule.75 At the trial, the oral confessions of three of the de-
fendants were admitted into evidence through the testimony of
several police officers; these confessions constituted the basis for
the state's case against the three."6 Each confession was redacted,
and the jury was instructed to consider each confession only
against the defendant who had made it." All of the defendants
Catanzaro).
74. 439 U.S. 978 (1978). See also Marcus, supra note 22, at 582. The Supreme Court
had actually been confronted with an interlocking confessions situation in the prior case of
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973). In that case two defendants were convicted at
a joint trial of "transporting stolen goods and of conspiracy to transport stolen goods in
interstate commerce ... ." Id. at 224. Both codefendants had made confessions to the police
upon their arrest, and their statements coincided on all material aspects of the crime. Id. at
225. Portions of both confessions, implicating each other in the crime, were introduced at
the trial. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a Bruton error had occurred
but that other evidence at the trial was so overwhelmingly against the defendants that the
error was harmless. Id. at 226 (relying on Harrington). The case went up to the Supreme
Court on appeal, and instead of deciding the case on the basis of the interlocking confes-
sions doctrine, the Court affirmed the decision of the Sixth Circuit. Brown was distinguished
in Parker, however, "[b]ecause the Solicitor General [in Brown] conceded that the state-
ments were admitted into evidence in violation of Bruton [thus] we had no occasion to
consider the question whether introduction of the interlocking confessions doctrine violated
Bruton." 442 U.S. at 67 n.5.
75. 442 U.S. at 64. The murder victim, Douglas, a professional gambler, had engaged
in a poker game with defendant Robert Wood. Wood did not know that the game was
played with a marked deck and lost a sum of money to Douglas. Two subsequent games led
to the same result. Suspicious of having been cheated, Robert Wood arranged with his
brother Joe Wood to commit a robbery at the next game. Joe Wood enlisted the services of
defendants Randolph, Pickens, and Hamilton. During the fourth game, before the robbery
could take place, Douglas armed himself with a pistol and a shotgun. Seeing this, Joe Wood
pulled out a weapon, gave it to Robert Wood to hold on Douglas and an accomplice, and
went to call in the other defendants. Before they could arrive, however, Robert Wood shot
and killed Douglas when the latter made a move for his gun. When Joe Wood, Hamilton,
Randolph, and Pickens arrived, the five men took the cash from the game and fled. Id.
76. Id. at 67. An eyewitness to the crime could not positively identify Randolph, Pick-
ens, or Hamilton as the men who had participated in the robbery. Defendant Robert Wood
could only name Hamilton as one of the accomplices. Thus, but for their oral confessions,
the state's case against the defendants was not very substantial.
77. Id. The Court, however, noted that the redaction had been ineffective, leaving "no
possible doubt in the jurors' minds concerning the 'person[s]' referred to." Id. at 67 n.3
(quoting Randolph v. Parker, 575 F.2d 1178, 1180 (6th Cir. 1978)).
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were convicted of murder in the first degree, and all of them ap-
pealed, claiming that the admission of confessions at the trial was
a violation of Bruton.~
In Parker, four members of the Supreme Court held that the
admission of codefendant confessions where those confessions in-
terlock and are accompanied by a limiting instruction is not a vio-
lation of the sixth amendment right of confrontation. They further
held that Bruton is inapplicable in such situations.79 Although
agreeing with the Bruton rationale that a codefendant's confession
could be highly prejudicial to a defendant who has maintained his
or her innocence by not confessing, the plurality claimed that a
different question is presented where a defendant's own confession
has been offered into evidence.
[T]he incriminating statements of a codefendant will seldom,
if ever, be of the "devastating" character referred to in Bruton
when the incriminated defendant has admitted his own guilt. The
right protected by Bruton-the "constitutional right of cross-ex-
amination" ... has far less practical value to a defendant who
has confessed to the crime than to one who has consistently main-
tained his innocence. Successfully impeaching a codefendant's
confession on cross-examination would likely yield small advan-
tage to the defendant whose own admission of guilt stands before
the jury unchallenged.80
The plurality justified its decision by looking exclusively to
78. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the convictions of Randolph,
Hamilton, and Pickens. The court held that the admission of their confessions at trial had
violated Bruton. 442 U.S. at 67. The Tennessee Supreme Court subsequently reversed and
reinstated the convictions, relying on the interlocking confessions exception to Bruton. 442
U.S. at 68. The District Court for the Western District of Tennessee granted applications
for writs of habeas corpus, holding that the Bruton rule had been violated. Id. The Sixth
Circuit affirmed and commented on the conflict over the interlocking confessions doctrine:
"We are fully aware that our rejection of the 'interlocking' confession theory underscores a
conflict between the... Sixth Circuit... and the views of the Second Circuit ....
"But in no instance has the Supreme Court overruled Bruton or suggested that either
identity or greater or lesser similarity of confessions presented by hearsay and without con-
frontation served to make them admissible .... We believe that Bruton v. United States is
controlling law." Randolph v. Parker, 575 F.2d 1178, 1183 (6th Cir. 1978), modified, 442 U.S.
62 (1979). Certiorari was subsequently granted by the Supreme Court. 439 U.S. 978 (1978).
79. 442 U.S. at 75. Although the Supreme Court considered only the Bruton issue,
other questions also had been raised by the three defendants. The first was whether they
could be found guilty of felony murder because they had arrived on the scene after the
shooting had taken place. The second was whether a written confession made by Pickens
had been a violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436 (1966). Both issues
were considered satisfactorily resolved by the lower courts. 442 U.S. at 67-68.
80. 442 U.S. at 73.
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the character of the defendants' confessions. In the plurality's
view, a confession is "'probably the most probative and damaging
evidence that can be admitted'" against a defendant, who is "'the
most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information
about his past conduct.' ,81 The plurality thus proposed that the
effect of a defendant's confession upon a jury is so damaging and
so persuasive that the admission of any other information would
have an insignificant effect on the outcome of the jury's
determination.82
The defendant in Parker did not have the opportunity to
cross-examine the witness who made a statement inculpating him
in the commission of the crime. Nevertheless, the plurality of the
Court, in contrast to its prior position in Bruton, held that no vio-
lation of the right of confrontation had occurred, because limiting
instructions had been given.83 Noting that the primary purpose of
cross-examination is to test the truth of an adverse witness' testi-
mony,84 the plurality reasoned that little could be gained by con-
fronting the witness because "[s]uccessfully impeaching a code-
fendant's confession would likely yield small advantage to the
defendant whose own admission of guilt stands before the jury un-
challenged."" Under the Parker plurality's rationale; if a defen-
dant's confession contains the same facts as a codefendant's con-
fession, no controversy or issue will be raised when the co-
defendant's confession also is introduced at trial. The necessity of
cross-examination thus is negated. If the confession completely in-
terlocks, the plurality continued, Bruton protective measures to
guard against unreliable codefendant confessions would serve little
purpose because the reliability of such a confession would be en-
hanced by a defendant's own corroborative confession.88 Accord-
81. Id. (citing Justice White's dissent in Bruton). "[The defendant's own confession is
probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him.
Though itself an out-of-court statement, it is admitted as reliable evidence because it is an
admission of guilt by the defendant and constitutes direct evidence of the facts to which it
relates. Even the testimony of an eyewitness may be less reliable than the defendant's own
confession. An observer may not correctly perceive, understand, or remember the acts of
another, but the admissions of a defendant come from the actor himself, the most knowl-
edgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct." 391 U.S. at 139-
40.
82. See note 64 supra.
83. 442 U.S. at 75.
84. See notes 1-5 & accompanying text supra.
85. 442 U.S. at 73.
86. Id.
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ingly, the danger of a jury being incapable of following limiting in-
structions and any resulting prejudice to the defendant are
neutralized under the Parker plurality's rationale; no additional
testimony of a codefendant could add to a defendant's self-
incrimination.
Four members of the Court rejected the plurality's adoption of
the interlocking confessions doctrine.8 7 Instead, the dissenting and
concurring opinions expressed strict adherence to the Bruton-
harmless error approach as established prior to Parker. According
to the dissent:
[P]roper analysis of this case requires that we differentiate be-
tween (1) a conclusion that there was no error under the rule of
Bruton v. United States ... and (2) a conclusion that even if
constitutional error was committed, the possibility that inadmis-
sible evidence contributed to the conviction is so remote that we
may characterize the error as harmless."
Contrary to the plurality view, the other members of the Court did
not recognize the introduction of a defendant's own confession as
significant but instead focused on the lack of opportunity to cross-
examine a codefendant who has made an interlocking confession.
The implication of Parker is that the Supreme Court has left
unresolved the question of which approach-the interlocking con-
fessions doctrine or the Bruton-harmless error analysis-is proper
for deciding interlocking confessions cases.8 9 Because the Supreme
Court is evenly divided on the issue, lower courts may continue to
utilize either approach.
Several criticisms, however, may be directed at the plurality
opinion in Parker: (1) a defendant's confession will not always be
so reliable and so compelling that the admission of a codefendant's
confession would be rendered insignificant; (2) limiting instruc-
tions designed to negate any prejudicial effects of a codefendant's
confession are not more effective than in a Bruton situation simply
87. Justice Blackmun, although concurring in the result, joined dissenting Justices
Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall in rejecting the plurality's adoption of the interlocking con-
fessions doctrine. Justice Powell took no part in the case. Id. at 77.
88. Id. at 81. Applying the Bruton-harmless error analysis to the Parker case, Justice
Blackmun found that "any Bruton error... clearly was harmless." Justice Stevens, with
Brennan and Marshall joining, deferred to the determinations of the lower courts in finding
that there had been a Bruton error and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 82.
89. See notes 59-61 & accompanying text supra. See also Marcus, supra note 22, at
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because a defendant's own confession has been introduced at trial;
(3) an unchallenged, unconfronted confession of a codefendant
may be unreliable, resulting in substantial prejudice to a defen-
dant; and (4) Parker creates a per se rule whereby the admission at
a joint trial of a codefendant's interlocking confession will auto-
matically preclude a court from considering whether a defendant
might have been prejudiced by such an admission.
The dissent in Parker points out a crucial assumption made
by the plurality in support of the interlocking confessions doctrine:
that a defendant's own confession is so reliable that the admission
of a codefendant's confession would not significantly add to the
case against the defendant.90 The plurality offers no support for
this assumption but implicitly relies on the fact that each co-
defendant's confession was unchallenged and thus reliable.91 Be-
cause the plurality proceeds from this assumption, a showing that
it is not always true illuminates a significant flaw in the interlock-
ing confessions doctrine.
9 2
90. 442 U.S. at 84. Rather than offer convincing authority for this assumption, the
Court simply gives reference to Justice White's dissent in Bruton. See notes 80-82 & accom-
panying text supra.
91. 442 U.S. at 72. The Court does not define the term unchallenged confession. Jus-
tice Stevens, in his dissent, makes note of this omission in the Court's reasoning, stating
that there is no reason why the failure of a defendant to challenge his or her own confession
should make it any more reliable and that even if a defendant challenged his or her own
confession, under Parker he or she would not be able to dispel the incriminating effect of a
codefendant's confession. Id. at 84, 86.
92. In his dissent in Parker, Justice Stevens constructs the following hypothetical to
show the fallacy in the Court's belief that confessions by defendants invariably would be
reliable:
"Suppose a prosecutor has 10 items of evidence tending to prove that defendant X and
codefendant Y are guilty of assassinating a public figure. The first is a tape of a televised
interview with Y describing in detail how he and X planned and executed the crime. Items
two through nine involve circumstantial evidence of past association between X and Y, a
shared hostility for the victim, and an expressed wish for his early demise-evidence that in
itself might very well be insufficient to convict X. Item 10 is the testimony of a drinking
partner, a former cellmate, or a divorced spouse of X who vaguely recalls X saying that he
had been with Y at the approximate time of the killing. Neither X nor Y takes the stand.
"If Y's televised confession were placed before the jury while Y was immunized from
cross-examination, it would undoubtedly have the 'devastating' effect on X that the Bruton
rule was designed to avoid.... [I]t would also plainly violate X's Sixth Amendment right to
confront his accuser. Nevertheless, under the plurality's ... remarkable assumption, the
prejudice to X-and the violation of his constitutional right-would be entirely cured by the
subsequent use of evidence of his own ambiguous statement. In my judgment, such dubious
corroboration would enhance, rather than reduce, the danger that the jury would rely on Y's
televised confession when evaluating Xs guilt.... Even if I am wrong, however, there is no
reason to conclude that the prosecutor's reliance on item 10 would obviate the harm flowing
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The findings of fact in Parker attest to the weakness of the
plurality's assumption that a defendant's confession is always reli-
able."3 The Sixth Circuit did not find any of the defendants' con-
fessions to be so reliable that admission of their codefendants' con-
fessions would have been nonprejudicial 4 Instead, the circuit
court determined that the results reached by the jury may indeed
have depended upon the admission of all three codefendants' con-
fessions, rather than upon each defendant's individual confession
standing alone.9 5 This is exactly the situation which the interlock-
ing confessions doctrine purports to avoid. The Sixth Circuit
found, in essence, that reasonable persons could differ as to
whether a defendant's own confession was sufficiently reliable to
allow the jury to reach its verdict irrespective of the codefendant
confessions. Significantly, in applying the harmless error test,96 the
circuit court could not find that the evidence, exclusive of the co-
defendant confessions, was so overwhelming that any error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.9
The import of the Sixth Circuit's opinion is that if a defen-
dant's own confession is not sufficiently reliable or self-incriminat-
ing, the jury very well may look to the inculpatory statements of
codefendants when considering the guilt or innocence of the defen-
dant.' The Supreme Court's assumption that a defendant's own
unchallenged confession is always reliable, therefore, is improper.
from the use of item one." Id. at 84-85 (citations omitted).
93. See notes 81-82 & accompanying text supra.
94. The court of appeals stated: "Assuming that two of the three confessions had been
removed from jury consciousness by adherence to Bruton, we find it impossible to conclude
that the jury finding and ultimate verdict would, 'beyond reasonable doubt,' have been the
same." Randolph v. Parker, 575 F.2d 1178, 1183 (6th Cir. 1978), modified, 442 U.S. 62
(1979).
95. The circuit court listed several crucial factors which might have tended to show
the defendants' innocence, where, as in the case of separate trials, the Bruton rule would
preclude admission of codefendant confessions:
"1) Randolph, Pickens and Hamilton were not involved in the gambling game between
Douglas, the Las Vegas gambler, and Robert Wood, the hometown gambler who got cheated.
"2) They were not involved in originating the plan for recouping Robert Wood's losses.
"3) They were not in the room (and had not been) when Robert Wood killed Douglas.
"4) Indeed, the jury could conclude from the admissible evidence in this case that when
Joe Wood pulled out his pistol, the original plan for the three 'unknown' [defendants] to rob
the... poker game was aborted and that petitioners' subsequent entry into the room did
not involve them in the crime of murder." 575 F.2d at 1182-83.
96. See notes 52-58 & accompanying text supra.
97. 575 F.2d at 1183.
98. See notes 22-25 & accompanying text supra.
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Although a defendant's unchallenged confession may be reliable in
many cases, this fact does not justify dispensing with the Bruton-
harmless error analysis and the confrontation clause which it
protects.99
The dissent in Parker also takes exception to the plurality's
assumption that a jury is more capable of following a limiting in-
structon when a defendant has placed his or her confession before
the jury 00 than in a Bruton situation in which only a codefendant
has confessed and the defendant has remained silent. The plurality
resorted to the rationale previously set forth in Delli Paoli,101 that
juries can be trusted to follow limiting instructions from the trial
court,1 02 and ignored the rejection of this rationale in Bruton,
which expressly overruled Delli Paoli.10
Parker did not overrule Bruton in favor of its prior holding in
Delli Paoli. However, it appears that the Bruton rationale, restrict-
ing the use of limiting instructions in those cases where a code-
fendant's confession has been introduced at trial, was lost upon the
99. See note 94 & accompanying text supra.
100. 442 U.S. at 84.
101. See notes 22-31 & accompanying text supra.
102. "A crucial assumption underlying [the jury] system is that juries will follow the
instructions given them by the trial judge." 442 U.S. at 73. The plurality relies on a case
decided prior to Delli Paoli to support its position that no Bruton violation would occur
under the interlocking confessions doctrine. The Court cites Opper v. United States, 348
U.S. 84 (1954), in stating that "an instruction directing the jury to consider a codefendant's
extrajudicial statement only against its source has been found sufficient to avoid offending
the confrontation right of the implicated defendant... ." 442 U.S. at 73-74. The decision in
Opper is based on the same premise found in Delli Paoli, namely, that the "theory of trial
relies upon the ability of a jury to follow instructions." 348 U.S. at 95. The Parker Court
therefore appears to circumvent the fact that Delli Paoli was overruled by merely citing a
case which preceded it.
103. See note 36 & accompanying text supra. In his concurring opinion in Bruton,
Justice Stewart wrote: "I think it clear that the underlying rationale of the Sixth Amend-
ment's Confrontation Clause precludes reliance upon cautionary instructions when the high-
ly damaging out-of-court statement of a codefendant, who is not subject to cross-examina-
tion, is deliberately placed before the jury at a joint trial. A basic premise of the
Confrontation Clause, it seems to me, is that certain kinds of hearsay ... are at once so
damaging, so suspect, and yet so difficult to discount, that jurors cannot be trusted to give
such evidence the minimal weight it logically deserves, whatever instructions the trial judge
might give." 391 U.S. at 137-38 (citations omitted). It also has been suggested that instruc-
tions actually might alert jurors to the fact that codefendant confessions refer to a defen-
dant when the jurors had not realized this fact during the trial. 442 U.S. at 90 n.14. Cf.
Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 345 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (instructions com-
menting on defendant's failure to testify); Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project,
38 NEB. L. Rav. 744, 754 (1959) (instructions to disregard evidence of defendant's insurance
coverage in determining damages).
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plurality in Parker. Even assuming, as the plurality did, that the
failure of a jury to follow limiting instructions would not be harm-
ful to a defendant because the confessions would be interlocking
and therefore substantially the same, the possibility of a detrimen-
tal "cumulative impact"10 4 where a defendant's confession alone is
not sufficiently compelling for a conviction remains. 1°5 Although
the Court in Bruton did not say that limiting instructions could
never be effective,108 the Parker plurality's approach always would
preclude exclusion of a codefendant's confession so long as the de-
fendant has made an interlocking confession.
The plurality also summarily dismisses Bruton safeguards
which protect against unreliable codefendant confessions, reason-
ing that "the incriminated defendant has corroborated his code-
fendant's statements by heaping blame onto himself."107 However,
a significant risk of harm is created where the plurality's preceding
assumptions fail, as where a defendant's confession is not sufficient
for a conviction but where the cumulative effect of interlocking
confessions upon a jury that is unable to follow limiting instruc-
tions is harmful.10 8
The Court in Bruton addressed the very nature of codefend-
ant confessions and concluded that they are so unreliable that they
should not heavily influence the jury's verdict.
Not only are the incriminations devastating to the defendant
but their credibility is inevitably suspect, a fact recognized when
accomplices do take the stand and the jury is instructed to weigh
their testimony carefully given the recognized motivation to shift
blame to others. The unreliability of such evidence is intolerably
compounded when the alleged accomplice ... does not testify
and cannot be tested by cross-examination. It was against such
104. See note 112 infra.
105. The plurality in Parker assumed that if confessions interlocked, the risk of harm
to codefendants would be slight because the confessions would overlap as to admissions of
guilt. However, "it does not necessarily follow that the additional evidence of the [defen-
dant's] confession mitigated the prejudice resulting from the admission of the confession of
his nontestifying codefendant. If anything, the [defendant is] even more prejudiced by the
admission in that his codefendant's statement bolstered the [defendant's] own confession
and made it more believable to the jury. Thus, the jury might have interlocked the two
confessions, thereby increasing the likelihood of a guilty verdict." Note, supra note 60, at
804 (commenting on the use of the interlocking confessions doctrine in Catanzaro). See
notes 62-67 & accompanying text supra.
106. See note 46 & accompanying text supra.
107. 442 U.S. at 73.
108. See notes 90-106 & accompanying text supra.
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threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation Clause was
directed."' 9
This warning from Bruton goes unheeded in Parker, however,
because the plurality assumes that a defendant's own confession is
beyond reproach.110 The plurality proposes simply to excuse unre-
liable codefendant confessions from Bruton protective measures,
assuming as Justice White did in his dissent in Bruton, that a de-
fendant's confession is the most "knowledgeable and unimpeacha-
ble source of information about his past conduct.""' Nor does
Parker present a compelling reason why the right of cross-exami-
nation would not serve important truth-determining functions
where interlocking codefendant confessions are introduced into ev-
idence at trial; there can be no assurance that the jury will con-
sider only a defendant's confession exclusive of any interlocking
confessions." 2 Therefore, the plurality's assertion that there had
not been a violation of the confrontation clause because the right
of confrontation would serve no purpose to the defendant is
incorrect.
In Parker, the plurality's departure from the Bruton-harmless
error approach moves the courts away from the use of a flexible,
case by case analysis toward a nondiscretionary per se rule in con-
sidering whether confrontation rights have been violated under the
sixth amendment. Under the Bruton-harmless error approach, a
reviewing court must scrutinize all of the evidence and circum-
stances of the case in determining whether any error has been
109. 391 U.S. at 136. See Note, supra note 60, at 804 n.62. "[T]he evidence of a wit-
ness [who is a confessed accomplice] is not to be taken as that of an ordinary witness, of
good character, in a case whose testimony is generally and prima facie supposed to be cor-
rect. On the contrary, the evidence of such a witness ought to be received with suspicion,
and with the very greatest care and caution, and ought not to be passed upon by the jury
under the same rules governing other and apparently credible witnesses." Crawford v.
United States, 212 U.S. 183, 204 (1909). Accord, Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,
495 (1917).
110. See notes 90-99 & accompanying text supra.
111. 391 U.S. at 140.
112. In United States ex rel. Ortiz v. Fritz, 476 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1075 (1973), a panel of the Second Circuit criticized the interlocking confessions doctrine
because of its failure to guard against unreliable codefendant confessions: "Despite the de-
fendant's own confession, the jury may still look to the incriminating statements of a code-
fendant, or to the cumulative impact of those statements coupled with the defendant's own
statements, to find the defendant's guilt-despite the 'placebo' of curative instructions." 476
F.2d at 40. The court adopted the interlocking confessions doctrine in deciding the case only
because it felt compelled to do so by prior decisions in that circuit. Id. at 38.
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committed that requires reversal.11 However, under Parker, the
admission in evidence of a defendant's interlocking confession au-
tomatically precludes consideration of whether a defendant has
been unduly prejudiced by a codefendant's confession;114 so long as
the defendant has made an interlocking confession there can be no
violation of Bruton and no violation of the constitutional right of
confrontation. Thus, Parker abolishes examination of the totality
of circumstances in determining whether the fundamental right of
an individual to confront adverse witnesses has been violated.1 '
The split within the Supreme Court in Parker means that the
appropriateness of the interlocking confessions doctrine as applied
to codefendant confession cases is unresolved. Even if the doctrine
were to be adopted by a majority of the Court upon reconsidera-
tion of the issue, however, the Court would have to address a sig-
nificant omission in Parker. In applying the interlocking confes-
sions doctrine, the plurality failed to define both what constitutes
a confession and what constitutes an interlocking confession.
Not every extrajudicial statement implicating a defendant is a
confession.1 6 However, the plurality in Parker offers no guidance
as to what criteria should be applied in determining what consti-
tutes a confession for interlocking confessions purposes. Trial
courts have been left to grapple with the problem on their own,
creating the possibility of inconsistent determinations.
Even if it is assumed that a trial court could distinguish a con-
fession from other types of extrajudicial statements in order to ap-
ply the interlocking confessions doctrine, there would be a serious
problem in determining what constitutes an interlocking confes-
sion because Parker fails to define this term as well. The plurality
opinion does not specify what degree of overlap in the confessions
113. See notes 52-58 & accompanying text supra.
114. See notes 80-86 & accompanying text supra.
115. In his Bruton dissent, Justice White criticized the Bruton rule as being "exces-
sively rigid," because it disregarded other "circumstances" of a particular case. 391 U.S. at
139. Harrington and the harmless error test apparently remedied the inflexibility of Bruton
by permitting a reviewing court to look at other evidence in the case in deciding whether the
violation of confrontation rights was harmless. See notes 52-58 & accompanying text supra.
116. In Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), and Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S.
293 (1968), extrajudicial statements made by the defendant were introduced at a joint trial
along with their codefendant's confessions. Justice Rehnquist distinguished both cases from
an interlocking confessions case by stating that the extrajudicial statements of the defen-
dants were not in fact confessions, indicating that some types of statements are not subject
to the interlocking confessions doctrine. 442 U.S. 71-72 n.5, 75-76 n.8.
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is necessary to invoke the interlocking confessions doctrine.117
More significantly, as stated by Justice Blackmun in his concurring
opinion, the interlocking confessions approach does not appear to
require an inquiry as to whether confessions actually interlocked
before the doctrine could be imposed.118 Without a definition of
what an interlocking confession is and without a preliminary deter-
mination as to whether two confessions do in fact interlock, there
may be a substantial risk of harm to a defendant should trial
courts invoke Parker. Justice Blackmun concluded:
The fact that confessions may interlock to some degree does
not ensure, as a per se matter, that their admission will not
prejudice a defendant so substantially that a limiting instruction
will not be curative. The two confessions may interlock in part
only. Or they may cover only a portion of the events in issue at
the trial. Although two interlocking confessions may not be inter-
nally inconsistent, one may go far beyond the other in implicating
the confessor's codefendant. In such circumstances, the admission
of the confession of the codefendant who does not take the stand
could very well serve to prejudice the defendant who is incrimi-
nated by the confession, notwithstanding that the defendant's
own confession is, to an extent, interlocking.119
A substantial risk of prejudice attends any defendant whose
own confession does not "interlock" or cover the same inculpating
aspects of a codefendant's confession. If a defendant has the op-
portunity to cross-examine the codefendant, any discrepancies be-
tween their confessions can be brought to the attention of the jury
for consideration. 2 0 When, however, there is no opportunity to
confront a codefendant as to his or her extrajudicial statement, the
failure to exclude such a statement from the trial clearly would be
117. See note 128 & accompanying text infra.
118. 442 U.S. at 80.
119. Id. at 79 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In United States ex rel. Johnson v. Yeager,
399 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1027 (1969), a case which impliedly re-
jected the interlocking confessions doctrine by following the Bruton-harmless error ap-
proach, the Third Circuit noted the significance of noninterlocking confessions: "In this
case, the confessions varied materially on the extent of the participation of the co-defen-
dants in the planning and execution of the crime.... Under these circumstances, the consti-
tutional error of admitting these confessions in evidence during a joint trial 'presents a seri-
ous risk that the issue of guilt or innocence may not have been reliably determined.'...
'Plainly the introduction of [these] confessions added substantial, perhaps even critical,
weight to the Government's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, since [the de-
fendants] did not take the stand. [Appellants] thus [were] denied [their] right of confronta-
tion.'" 399 F.2d at 510-11 (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. at 127-28).
120. See notes 1-5 & accompanying text supra.
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harmful; the defendant would be denied the right to cross-examine
the codefendant regarding items of conduct to which the defen-
dant had not confessed. The Parker plurality creates this possibil-
ity by failing to define precisely what would constitute an inter-
locking confession and by failing to require a preliminary inquiry
as to whether codefendant confessions sufficiently interlock.""'
Moreover, the danger in not having a working definition is
magnified by the possibility that codefendant confessions may be
unreliable 122 and that juries may not be able to follow a judge's
limiting instructions. 23 When codefendant confessions do not com-
pletely interlock, there is a risk that a defendant will be prejudiced
by evidence he or she did not confess to, that the corroborative
evidence may be highly unreliable, and that such corroborative evi-
dence is subject not to cross-examination but only to protective
instructions to the jury not to consider it against the defendant. In
such a situation, it is difficult to maintain that the confrontation
clause has not been infringed upon.
A Proposal
With an evenly divided Court, lower courts will be able to
choose either the interlocking confessions doctrine of Parker or the
Bruton-harmless error approach as a rationale in deciding inter-
locking confessions cases. Because the interlocking confessions doc-
trine contains several inherent dangers, the preferable approach to
codefendant confession cases would be the Bruton-harmless error
analysis. Such an approach protects a defendant's confrontation
rights by prohibiting the introduction of codefendant confessions
where there is no opportunity to cross-examine that codefendant,
except in those instances where a denial of that right clearly would
be harmless. The Bruton-harmless error approach has operated
satisfactorily, even in an interlocking confessions situation, 24 and a
departure from this approach is not mandated.
Should the interlocking confessions doctrine be adopted, how-
ever, several precautions should be taken to ensure greater protec-
121. Justice Blackmun noted that the plurality did not make a determination as to
whether the confessions of the defendants in Parker interlocked but that the plurality
merely assumed they did. 442 U.S. at 80.
122. See notes 107-11 & accompanying text supra.
123. See notes 100-06 & accompanying text supra.
124. See note 74 supra.
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tion for a defendant who is not afforded the opportunity of cross-
examination. To apply the interlocking confessions doctrine prop-
erly, the trial court must make a two-step preliminary determina-
tion as to: (1) whether the extrajudicial statements of codefendants
constitute confessions; and (2) whether the confessions interlock
completely.
25
An accepted definition of a confession is a statement by the
defendant "admitting or acknowledging all facts necessary for con-
viction of the crime. ' 126 Only by requiring that all of the essential
elements of the crime be present in a defendant's extrajudicial
statement can the plurality's proposition-that the defendant's
own confession is "'probably the most probative and damaging ev-
idence that can be admitted against him' ""27-be supported. This
definition of a confession would protect a defendant from any un-
fair influence of codefendant confessions where the interlocking
confessions doctrine is utilized.
A more difficult task is creating a standard to determine
whether codefendant confessions interlock. Several of the circuit
courts adopting the interlocking confessions doctrine have required
only that the confessions be "substantially" interlocking or at least
consistent as to the material aspects of the confessions.2 8 How-
ever, because the fundamental right of confrontation is involved, a
125. See notes 116-21 & accompanying text supra. See also Marcus, supra note 22, at
588.
126. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at § 144. "A confession is generally defined as an ac-
knowledgment by accused in a criminal case of his guilt of the crime charged. A confession
implies that the matter confessed constitutes a crime, and it is limited in its nature and in
its precise scope and meaning to the criminal act itself. In order that a statement may con-
stitute a confession it must be made after the offense has been committed, and must be of
such nature that no other inference than the guilt of the confessor may be drawn therefrom.
Accordingly, the term 'confession' excludes exculpatory statements ... and in general all
statements, declarations, and admissions, by word or act, which do not amount to an ac-
knowledgment of guilt." 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 816, at 150-52 (1961). See Opper v.
United States, 348 U.S. 84, 91 n.7 (1954).
127. 442 U.S. at 72.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Fleming, 594 F.2d 598, 603 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 931 (1979) (requiring "substantially similar" confessions); United States ex rel. Stan-
bridge v. Zelker, 514 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 872 (1975) (the interlocking
confessions doctrine "does not require absolute identity of statements[;] [i]t is sufficient if
the two confessions are substantially the same and consistent on the major elements of the
crime involved"); United States ex rel. Ortiz v. Fritz, 476 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1075 (1973) ("Although the three confessions do not all cover the same facts, they
do interlock and are consistent as regards the slaying. As to the time of commission, there is
a considerable discrepancy .... But we do not think it takes away from the 'interlocking'
aspect of the confessions").
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much stricter standard should be adopted. In order for the inter-
ests of the defendant to be adequately protected, the confessions of
each codefendant should corroborate every essential element nec-
essary to convict each codefendant of the crime. Such a standard
likely would reduce the risk that the admission of a codefendant's
confession might contribute to the conviction of another codefend-
ant because the confessions would be essentially the same. Where
the confessions do not completely interlock, as where each confes-
sion does not admit to each of the essential elements of a crime,
the case should be removed from 'the realm of Parker and the in-
terlocking confessions doctrine, and should be analyzed under the
Bruton-harmless error approach.
Conclusion
A problem arises in joint criminal trials where the prosecution
attempts to introduce into evidence a confession made by a code-
fendant implicating other codefendants in the crime. Where there
is no opportunity to cross-examine the defendant who made the
confession, substantial prejudice may be imposed upon other code-
fendants who cannot test the confession for its truth. Under the
rule of Bruton v. United States and Harrington v. California, the
admission of such a confession is a violation of the confrontation
clause of the sixth amendment and grounds for reversal unless the
constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Re-
cently, however, federal and state courts have used an interlocking
confessions approach, holding that the admission of a codefend-
ant's confession, where the jury is cautioned with limiting instruc-
tions, does not violate the confrontation clause so long as the other
codefendants have also confessed and the confessions interlock.
The United States Supreme Court, in Parker v. Randolph, did
not resolve the issue of which approach is proper in cases in which
interlocking confessions have been made. Four members of the
Court adhered to the Bruton-harmless error approach, whereas a
four-member plurality adopted the interlocking confessions doc-.
trine. Lower courts may therefore continue to utilize either ratio-
nale in the disposition of interlocking confessions cases, even
though there are significant weaknesses in the plurality's opinion
in Parker.
The plurality in Parker ignores the Bruton-harmless error rea-
soning that in general if a defendant is denied the opportunity to
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cross-examine an adverse witness the defendant is deprived of his
or her confrontation rights, although that error may later be deter-
mined to have been harmless by an appellate court. Even though a
defendant faces a similar situation where a codefendant has made
an interlocking confession and the defendant is unable to cross-
examine him or her, no violation of the right of confrontation is
said to have occurred. This assertion rests primarily on the fact
that the defendant also has confessed, that this confession is com-
pletely reliable, and that it interlocks with codefendant confes-
sions. Under a per se rule, a defendant may at times be deprived of
a valuable right, especially because (1) the defendant's confession
may be unreliable; (2) limiting instructions are rendered no more
effective, and a jury no more capable of following them, merely be-
cause the defendant has confessed; and (3) the interlocking confes-
sions doctrine provides absolutely no protection against the likeli-
hood that a codefendant's confession may be unreliable and that a
jury may indeed be influenced by the cumulative impact of those
confessions.
On its face, the interlocking confessions doctrine appears to be
a valid protective measure against the highly prejudicial nature of
codefendant confessions, because a codefendant's confession alone
will often be incriminating and reliable enough to sustain a convic-
tion. As this Note has demonstrated, however, the underlying as-
sumptions upon which this doctrine is based contain inherent
flaws. As Justice Blackmun noted:
I fully recognize that in most interlocking-confession cases,
any error in admitting the confession of a nontestifying codefend-
ant will be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Even so, I would
not adopt a rigid per se rule that forecloses a court from weighing
all the circumstances in order to determine whether the defen-
dant in fact was unfairly prejudiced by the admission of even an
interlocking confession. Where he was unfairly prejudiced, the
mere fact that prejudice was caused by an interlocking confession
ought not to override the important interests that the Confronta-
tion Clause protects.
12 9
In addition, the plurality's opinion in Parker fails to define
precisely what constitutes an interlocking confession. At present,
there is no requirement that codefendant confessions completely
interlock, thereby creating the possibility that a defendant could
129. 442 U.S. at 79.
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be prejudiced by items of evidence not confessed to should the jury
fail to follow the trial court's instructions. For this reason it is
urged that the courts adopt the Bruton-harmless error rationale
and discard the interlocking confessions doctrine as an erroneous
construction of the sixth amendment right to confront inculpatory
witnesses. To diminish the risk of prejudice to a defendant, the
following procedural safeguards should be implemented if the in-
terlocking confessions doctrine is applied. Before invoking the in-
terlocking confessions doctrine, a trial court should make a prelim-
inary inquiry to determine that (1) an extrajudicial statement
admits to all the facts necessary for conviction of a crime and thus
constitutes a confession; and (2) that each codefendant confession
agrees on all of the essential elements of a crime in order to be an
interlocking confession.
Perhaps the Supreme Court will reconsider the issue in a sub-
sequent case. Until then, the application of either the interlocking
confessions doctrine or the Bruton-harmless error approach lies
within the province and discretion of the lower courts.
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